



# EVIDENCE OF MAERSK SHIPMENTS TO ISRAELI MILITARY

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# Executive Summary

From Sep 2023 to Sep 2024, **A.P. Moller Maersk** has shipped millions of pounds (lb) of military goods to the Israeli military from the United States, across more than 2,000 shipments, which included hulls, engines, or specialized parts for armored personnel carriers and tactical vehicles, as well as parts for aircraft and projectile systems.

Researchers with the **Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM)**'s **Mask Off Maersk** campaign reviewed 2,110 U.S. shipments on Maersk vessels listed as being shipped to or on behalf of the **Government of Israel's Ministry of Defense (IMOD)**, 827 of which were for armored vehicles, tactical vehicles, weapons systems, or parts thereof.<sup>1</sup> Some of these military supply chains that Maersk has been supporting with its shipping and logistics infrastructure include:

- **Namer Armored Personnel Carriers** (APC-MT883)
- **Oshkosh Joint Light Tactical Vehicles** (JLTVs)
- **Oshkosh Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles** (FMTVs)
- **Oshkosh Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks** (HEMTTs)
- **Flyer-72 Advanced Light Strike Vehicles** (ALSVs)
- **Engines or power packs for armored personnel carriers**
- **Projectile bodies**, likely for artillery shells
- **Breech rings**, possibly for large-caliber artillery systems or tank guns
- **Armored steel plates**, likely for military vehicles or personnel carriers

The above shipments and supply chains correspond to at least three known **Foreign Military Sales (FMS)** to Israel: a USD \$238 million firm-fixed-price contract for the sale of **Namer Armored Personnel Carrier** (APC-MT883) **engines** to **Rolls-Royce Solutions America Inc.**;<sup>2</sup> a USD \$159 million firm-fixed price contract for the sale of **M1148A1P2 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles** (FMTVs) to the **Oshkosh Corporation** (which was augmented with an additional USD \$583 million this August 2024);<sup>3</sup> and the sale of the **Flyer Advanced Light Strike Vehicles** (ALSVs), which were procured using U.S. military aid.<sup>4</sup> Many of the remaining shipments are likely connected to additional foreign military sales to Israel under the reporting threshold.

<sup>1</sup> A total of 2,556 shipments to or on behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD) were reviewed, with 2,110 shipped on Maersk vessels and 446 shipped on ZIM vessels. The breakdown of the 2,110 shipments is as follows: 827 of the 2,110 Maersk shipments to IMOD were hulls, engines, or specialized parts for armored personnel carriers and tactical vehicles, as well as parts for aircraft and projectile systems; 522 of the 2,110 Maersk shipments to IMOD were miscellaneous military goods, including cars, forklifts, tires, brake and transmission fluids, and other machinery; 28 of the 2,110 Maersk shipments to IMOD had Product Descriptions for Diplomatic Cargo; 733 of the 2,110 Maersk shipments to IMOD had no Product Description at all.

<sup>2</sup> [Arms Sale Notice](#), Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense (8 March 2019). Awarded to Rolls-Royce Solutions America Inc. (UEI: HYGLK2BNFKB3); Contract Award W56HZV-21-C-0087; **FY21 - \$193,999,241; FY24 - \$7925,722.**

<sup>3</sup> [Arms Sale Press Release](#), Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense (13 August 2024). [Note: the initial FMS of USD \$62.4 million is included in this expanded amount and no *Federal Register* Notice or DSCA Press Release is available due to it being below the congressional notification threshold.] Awarded to Oshkosh Defense LLC (UEI: ZMXAHH8M8VL8); Contract Award W56HZV-20-D-0009; **FY19 - \$159,138,000.**

<sup>4</sup> ["IDF gets new US-made tactical vehicles, names them Be'eri"](#), *Israel Hayom*.

Almost all of the military goods shipments examined (2104/2110) departed from the **Port of Elizabeth, NJ** (USEBH), with the remainder (6/2110) departing from the **Port of Houston, TX** (USHOU); and while not all explicitly state that the destination country was Israel, the receiving agent is listed as the **Government of Israel's Ministry of Defense**, such that it can be assumed they were ultimately delivered to Israel for military purposes. All shipments transited through the **Port of Algeciras, Spain** (ESALG). ESALG contains a Maersk hub terminal, fully operated by the **A.P. Moller Maersk** subsidiary **APM Terminals**,<sup>5</sup> on concession terms from the **Port Authority of Algeciras** (APBA).<sup>6</sup>

The evidence suggests that **Maersk typically sends one (1) ship per week from New Jersey to Spain, which typically includes approximately 1,000 tons of military cargo on this vessel on behalf of the Israeli military.** Cross referencing ship schedules and historical data, it can be safely concluded that the IMOD rarely misses a weekly trip on this line.

The implicated Maersk<sup>7</sup> ships include: **MAERSK ATLANTA** (IMO: 9348649), **MAERSK CHICAGO** (IMO: 9332975), **MAERSK COLUMBUS** (IMO: 9332987), **MAERSK DENVER** (IMO: 9332999), **MAERSK DETROIT** (IMO: 9333034), **MAERSK HARTFORD** (IMO: 9333008), **MAERSK KARACHI** (IMO: 9162215), **MAERSK KENSINGTON** (IMO: 9333010), **MAERSK KINLOSS** (IMO: 9333022), **MAERSK PITTSBURGH** (IMO: 9342176), **MAERSK SELETAR** (IMO: 9315197), and **MAERSK SENTOSA** (IMO: 9315202).<sup>8</sup>

Of these Maersk ships, all except for one (**MAERSK KARACHI**) are operated by its subsidiary **Maersk Line Limited** (MLL) and are participants in the **U.S. Maritime Administration** (MARAD)'s **Maritime Security Program** (MSP), where in addition to their commercial remit, the U.S.-registered vessels must make their ships and commercial transportation resources available to the **U.S. Department of Defense** (DoD) upon request.

The 2,110 shipments were categorized using their **Harmonized Tariff System (HS) Codes**, in effect the export category for the goods contained in the shipment. The following table summarizes the findings.

<sup>5</sup> Per APM Terminals port map: [APM Terminal Global Maps Updated 2023 v11](#).

<sup>6</sup> "[APM Terminals extends its presence at Algeciras until 2032](#)", *Container News*.

<sup>7</sup> Excluded from this analysis were the shipments via ZIM, which included MDT David armored vehicles or parts thereof, known to be used by the Israeli military.

<sup>8</sup> Two other ships of note are included in this data, W KITHIRA (IMO: 9215323) and W KYRENIA (IMO: 9211494)—both carried shipments with bill of lading numbers that began with "MAE", which is the Maersk code.

## Maersk shipments to Israeli Ministry of Defense, Sep 2023–Sep 2024

Category <sup>11</sup>	Shipments	Estimated Weight (lb) <sup>12</sup>	Corresponding HS Code
AIRCRAFT PARTS	34	646,590	<b>8807.30:</b> Parts of goods of heading 8801, 8802 or 8806: Other parts of airplanes, helicopters or unmanned aircraft
AIRCRAFT TIRES	34	617,722	<b>4011.30:</b> New pneumatic tires, of rubber: Of a kind used on aircraft
ARMORED PLATES	302	13,498,696	<b>7225.40:</b> Flat-rolled products of other alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more
FLYER ALSV	24	480,684	<b>8703.32:</b> Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons (other than those of heading 8702), including station wagons and racing cars OR 8708.99: Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of headings 8701 to 8705
MILITARY EQUIPMENT	32	670,235	<b>9803.20:</b> Military equipment not otherwise classified
MISCELLANEOUS	522	12,183,821	<b>All Other HS Codes</b>
NAMER APC	15	738,459	<b>8710.00:</b> Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles
NAMER APC POWER PACK	7	173,320	<b>8710.00:</b> Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles
OSHKOSH FMTV	104	2,050,460	<b>8710.00:</b> Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles
OSHKOSH HEMTT	20	1,161,173	<b>8710.00:</b> Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles
OSHKOSH JLTV	92	3,710,937	<b>8408.20:</b> Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines)
OSHKOSH OTHER	44	1,465,490	<b>8710.00:</b> Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles
PROJECTILE BODY	9	244,484	<b>9306.90:</b> Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions of war and parts thereof; cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, including shot and cartridge wads
RIFLE CUPS	32	1,343,199	<b>9306.30:</b> Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions of war and parts thereof; cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, including shot and cartridge wads
RINGS	8	291,993	<b>7225.40:</b> Flat-rolled products of other alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more
UNKNOWN ARMORED	66	1,412,574	<b>8710.00:</b> Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles
UNKNOWN ENGINES	4	154,956	<b>8408.20:</b> Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines)
DIPLOMATIC	28	657,537	<b>No HS Code:</b> Labeled as Diplomatic Cargo
NO PRODUCT DESCRIPTION	733	9,895,185	<b>No HS Code:</b> Empty Product Description
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,110</b>	<b>51,397,515</b>	

<sup>9</sup> In the cases summarized in the table, HS Codes were used to enact categorization. Regarding this categorization, the following rules and assumptions applied: (1) coding for specific supply chains (e.g., *NAMER APC*, *OSHKOSH JLTV*, *OSHKOSH FMTV*, *OSHKOSH HEMTT*, *Flyer ALSV*) applied only in cases where the equipment name was explicitly listed; (2) *AIRCRAFT PARTS* is a general term based on the HS Code 8807.30, for “parts of airplanes, helicopters or unmanned aircraft”, absent further information about what is contained in the shipment; (3) *NAMER APC* refers to shipments whose Product Descriptions mention “Namer Hulls”, which are the bodies of the Namer Armored Personnel Carrier; (4) *OSHKOSH OTHER* refers to shipments whose Product Descriptions mention the military vehicle company Oshkosh Corporation alongside the HS Code 8710.00, for “tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, or parts thereof”, but which could not be further classified as belonging to a specific type of vehicle; (5) *RINGS* refers to shipments whose Product Descriptions mention “breech rings,” which are components often used in large-caliber artillery systems or tank guns; (6) *ARMORED PLATES* refers to armored steel plates, which, given the significant weight, may be intended for the construction or upgrading of military or security vehicles such as armored personnel carriers (APCs) or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), noting that IFS has been interchangeably categorizing “steel plates” and “armored steel plates” the same way, despite the latter being regulated under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Category VII - G - 4; (7) *PROJECTILE BODY* refers to shipments whose Product Descriptions mention “projectile bodies” alongside the HS Code 9306.90, for “bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions”; and (8) *MISCELLANEOUS* refers to shipments with all other HS Codes, including cars, forklifts, tires, brake and transmission fluids, and other machinery.

<sup>10</sup> In some cases, the summed weights per shipment represent weights for several different items within the same containers. As a result, the values in this column are likely overcounts or undercounts, though the column sum total is accurate.

Several of the abovementioned exported goods categories refer to supply chains for Israeli military vehicles currently being used in the ongoing war on Gaza. It is worth noting that the product descriptions for these shipments often state that the products are not required to be regulated by the **International Maritime Dangerous Goods** (IMDG) code, and so likely did not include explosive materials.<sup>11</sup>

While most records in the dataset contain descriptions of the items contained within each shipment, a substantial number of records omit any such information. **Unidentified cargo**—shipments with entirely blank descriptions of their contents in their respective Bills of Lading—**accounted for almost 35 percent of all observed shipments since the beginning of the war on Gaza**. Particularly considering the Spanish government's action in May to block military shipments to Israel (see *next section*), it is entirely possible that **IMOD** is intentionally concealing the true nature of this cargo in order to flout restrictions on weapons shipments.

The Mask Off Maersk campaign invites **anonymous submissions of additional data or leads**. Contact us at [maerskmaskoff@proton.me](mailto:maerskmaskoff@proton.me)

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<sup>11</sup> The product descriptions often cite IMDG SP961.2, which is a special provision under the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) code that would not classify shipments of armored vehicles as dangerous because the armored vehicles don't contain hazardous materials (e.g., fuel, explosives, etc.) that would otherwise make them restricted, and subject to additional U.S. rules, such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In some cases, "Hazardous" goods and materials were listed in the Product Descriptions.

# Maersk Flouting Spanish Arms Embargo via Port of Algeciras

In May 2024, the **Government of Spain barred ships loaded with military goods destined for use in the war on Gaza from docking at its ports.**<sup>12</sup> However, it appears that **Maersk** is knowingly flouting this decision. Of the 2,110 shipments to the Israeli military that have transited through the Port of Algeciras, **944 passed through Algeciras after the Spanish government's announcement.** It is unclear if the Government of Spain is aware of this or has processes for additional enforcement.

After Maersk ships carrying military goods for Israel have docked in the Port of Algeciras, they are transhipped to Haifa or Ashdod by one of five ships operating in the Mediterranean: **MAERSK NORFOLK** (IMO: 9356139), **NYSTED MAERSK** (IMO: 220897), **NEXOE MAERSK** (IMO: 9220885), **MARIO A** (IMO: 9337377), or **WANDA A** (IMO: 9415947).<sup>13</sup>

To provide an example of the end-to-end supply chain, on 16 September 2024, the **MAERSK SENTOSA** (IMO: 9315202) traveled to Algeciras, with 866 tons on the vessel on behalf of the Israeli military. Included in the visible description was an entry for 19 tons, including HS Code: **9803.20** (“Military equipment not otherwise classified”) and HS Code: **8710.00** (“Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, motorized, whether or not fitted with weapons, and parts of such vehicles”). The rest of the 212 tons of disclosed equipment were mainly Steel Plates. The remaining 653 tons of equipment to the Israeli military were sent without a public description. These shipments were transhipped onto **NEXOE MAERSK** (IMO: 9220885) on 28 September 2024 and arrived in Ashdod, Israel on 13 October 2024.

<sup>12</sup> “[No Harbor for Genocide](#),” Progressive International (PI).

<sup>13</sup> All the aforementioned Maersk vessels travel along Route SLH Mediterranean Sea B (Algeciras → Alexandria → Mersin → Haifa → Vado Ligure → Fos sur Mer → Barcelona → Valencia → Casablanca → Algeciras). The WANDA A is the exception, which uses a complex route, which has included Algeciras → Haifa → Ashdod, but also passes through Suez to deliver to Port of Aqaba, Jordan. The NEXOE MAERSK typically uses the Route SLH Mediterranean B, but also occasionally uses Route Z51 (Port Said → Ashdod → Port Said).



Israeli soldiers are seen on a Namer APC near Palestine Square in Gaza City's Rimal neighborhood. December 19, 2023. (Emanuel Fabian/Times of Israel)

## Maersk and Namer Armored Personnel Carriers

Since the beginning of the war on Gaza, the Israeli military has pursued its campaign using **Namer** and **Eitan** armored personnel carriers (APCs) and **Merkava** main battle tanks (MBTs)—purchases and upgrades for all of these have been financially supported by the U.S. government.<sup>14</sup> In June 2024, eight Israeli soldiers were killed in an explosion in Rafah, Gaza, while inside a **Namer Armored Personnel Carrier** (APC-MT883). The **Namer** APCs have been used extensively in the current war on Gaza.

<sup>14</sup> “[Merkava, Namer, and Eitan: inside Israel’s new model army](#)”, *Army Technology*.

In March 2019, the **U.S. DoD** approved foreign military sale to Israel of power packs (engines and transmissions) for the **Namer** APCs, worth USD \$238 million. The engines were developed by **MTU America**, a subsidiary of **Rolls-Royce Solutions America Inc.**,<sup>15</sup> and are likely manufactured at **Rolls-Royce's Aiken Plant** in **Graniteville, SC**, for eventual export to the Israeli military across 56 proposed shipments from May 2021 to December 2025. In addition to the **Namer** engines—which are the same as those of the **Merkava**; the only major component of the tank made outside of Israel—**MTU America** also developed the MTU6V890 engines for the **Eitan**; all three vehicles have been used extensively in the war on Gaza.<sup>16</sup> Per the shipment data summarized above, **Maersk has shipped at least 19 Namer power packs to the Israeli military, across at least 7 shipments.**<sup>17</sup>

The detailed bid solicitation for the awarded contract states that shipments to the Israeli military should be sent with notice to the freight forwarder **Interglobal Forwarding Services (IFS)**, registered in Jersey City, NJ. **IFS** is responsible for arranging the transport from the site of production to the destination in Israel, representing itself as the “**agent of IMOD**” in the U.S. export data and is cited in documents scraped from the IMOD website as **IMOD's freight forwarder.** (*More on IFS on page 8*)

In addition, **hulls (bodies) of the Namer APCs** are also shipped by Maersk. These appear to be produced at the **Joint Systems Manufacturing Center (Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP))** in Lima, OH,<sup>18</sup> which is owned by the **U.S. DoD** and operated by **General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)**, a subsidiary of **General Dynamics**, with plant workers represented by **UAW Local 2075**.

Per the shipment data summarized above, **Maersk has shipped at least 17 Namer APC hulls to the Israeli military, across at least 13 shipments, all of which departed from the Port of Elizabeth and transited through the Port of Algeciras.**<sup>19,20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The MTU MT883 V12 diesel engines are from an MTU engine series used in both the Namer APC-MT883 and Merkava MK4 tanks. MTU America and Rolls-Royce Solutions America, Inc. operate at least three locations in the U.S.: a Regional Headquarters in Novi, MI; a Graniteville Production Facility (Aiken Plant) in Graniteville, SC; and a Power Generation Manufacturing Facility (Mankato Office) in Mankato, MN. The power packs less transmission are likely manufactured at the Aiken Plant, while the transmissions are **likely** manufactured at a facility in Muskegon, MI operated by RENK America LLC (UEI: SXLXWY1BHUT7).

<sup>16</sup> “**Rolls-Royce Holdings plc.**”, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).

<sup>17</sup> Product Descriptions and weight per unit of Power Pack were used to extrapolate the number of units shipped to a high degree of accuracy.

<sup>18</sup> “**Major improvements coming to Lima's tank plant**”, *Lima Ohio*.

<sup>19</sup> 15 shipments categorized as **NAMER APC**, less 2 shipments which were for Namer APC parts, not hulls.

<sup>20</sup> Only two Maersk lines transit from Algeciras with service to Israel: SLH Mediterranean Sea B (route: Algeciras, Spain → Alexandria, Egypt → Mersin, Turkey → Haifa, Palestine) and SLH Eastbound (route: Algeciras, Spain → Genoa, Italy → Alexandria, Egypt → Haifa, Palestine). It is unclear if these routes have been amended since the May 2024 Spanish government decision.





An Israeli soldier stands by a Oshkosh tactical vehicle with Palestinian detainees, Gaza Strip, December 8, 2023. (Yossi Zelig/Reuters)

## Maersk and Oshkosh Tactical Vehicles

In December 2023, photos emerged depicting dozens of stripped and blindfolded Palestinian captives in the bed of an **Oshkosh M1085 5-Ton Long Cargo** medium tactical vehicle, which was being used by the Israel military to transport prisoners into Israel for interrogation. Then, in October 2024, videos again emerged showing dozens of Palestinian men taken by the Israeli military in North Gaza and loaded inside the cargo bed of the same type of **Oshkosh** vehicle.<sup>21</sup> Per the shipment data summarized above, **Maersk has shipped at least 104 Oshkosh medium tactical vehicles to the Israeli military since the beginning of the war on Gaza.**<sup>22</sup>

As part of a longstanding<sup>23</sup> relationship with the Israeli military, **Oshkosh Defense LLC** has manufactured or currently manufactures bodies or parts for at least three vehicle types used by the Israeli military: **Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs)**, the aforementioned **Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs)**, and **Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs)**. Maersk is involved in shipping vehicles or vehicle parts from each of these vehicle types to the Israeli military, and **has made at least 260 shipments related to Oshkosh supply chains since the start of the war on Gaza—all from the Port of Elizabeth, NJ.**

<sup>21</sup> The video depicts an Oshkosh M1085 6x6 5-Ton Long Cargo Medium Tactical Vehicle. In December 2023, according to the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), “the Israeli military captured dozens of Palestinians in Gaza and transported them for interrogation. Individuals were stripped down to their underwear and publicly humiliated for hours, potentially in violation of international humanitarian law. At least some were transported in Oshkosh Medium Tactical Vehicles.” (Source: “[Oshkosh](#)”, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)).

<sup>22</sup> Product descriptions, dimensions, and weight were used to extrapolate the nature of the vehicles or vehicle parts to a high degree of accuracy.

<sup>23</sup> Since at least ca. 2010; a USD \$200 million purchase of FMTVs was made in 2017 by the Israeli military.

In October 2019, the **U.S. DoD** announced that **Oshkosh Defense LLC** had been awarded a USD **\$159 million firm-fixed-price Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract** for production of Israel's modified variant of the FMTVs, specifically Oshkosh **M1148A1P2** 8.8 Ton Load Handling System FMTVs, using the wheelbase of the Oshkosh **M1085A1P2** 5-Ton Long Cargo FMTVs. This **August 2024**, the FMS for the FMTVs was augmented with an **additional USD \$583 million**, with deliveries expected to begin in 2026.

Maersk also ships **HEMTTs** to the Israeli military, such as Oshkosh **M985A4** 8x8 MLRS Resupply HEMTTs, which are normally used for missile reloading. These have historically been transferred from the U.S. military directly to Israel as part of **Excess Defense Articles (EDA)** authorizations.<sup>24</sup> In addition, during the current war on Gaza, the Israeli military's artillery branch has outfitted **Oshkosh HEMTTs** with its **Lahav** multi-caliber launcher, which is constructed from the **Precise & Universal Launching System (PULS)** platform developed by **Elbit Systems**.<sup>25,26</sup>

## Spotlight on Interglobal Forwarding Services and Potential Abuses of Diplomatic Cargo Designations

**Interglobal Forwarding Services (IFS)**<sup>27</sup> registered in Jersey City, NJ, is the U.S. consignor and freight forwarder for the **Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD)**.<sup>28</sup> IFS operates for IMOD alongside another company with the same management, **G&B Packing Company, Inc.**,<sup>29</sup> registered in Jersey City, NJ—which receives and processes approved export licenses in the U.S. on behalf of Israel. In addition, on at least 14 occasions since the start of the war on Gaza, per a review of import/export data,<sup>30</sup> IFS served as the agent for export shipments on behalf of **IMI Systems**, the Israeli weapons manufacturer acquired by **Elbit Systems**.

<sup>24</sup> [Excess Defense Articles \(EDA\)](#), Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

<sup>25</sup> [“An Obscure Israeli Rocket System May Beat the Almighty HIMARS at Its Own Game”](#), *Popular Mechanics*.

<sup>26</sup> [“Israeli Army deploys new Lahav multi-caliber MLRS against Hamas militants in Gaza Strip”](#), *Global Defense News*.

<sup>27</sup> Interglobal Forwarding Services Inc. (Company ID: 0100185073), registered at 1A Colony Road, Jersey City, NJ 07305, with President Lawrence Grossman, Vice President Stanley Grossman, and Legal Agent Jack Fersk, per NJ Department of Treasury Corporate Report. [INTERGLOBAL FORWARDING SERVICES, INC. Summary.pdf](#).

<sup>28</sup> FMS freight forwarders must maintain a valid registration as an exporter with the U.S. Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC).

<sup>29</sup> G&B Packing Company, Inc. (Company ID: 0100001559), registered at 1A Colony Road, Jersey City, NJ 07305, with President Stanley Grossman, Vice President Lawrence Grossman, and Legal Agent Jack Fersk, per NJ Department of Treasury Corporate Report. [G & B PACKING COMPANY, INC. Summary.pdf](#).

<sup>30</sup> At least 14 export shipments were made to IMI Systems (UEI: GUWJUXAM1J79) via Interglobal Forwarding Services (IFS) between 7 October 2023 and 28 September 2024.

IFS has been cited in relation to the arms trade to Israel on two notable occasions. The first is in the **International Peace Information Service (IPIS) report *Fatal Freight* (2017)**, which details how IFS was used during the **2014 war on Gaza** (“Protective Edge”) so that the bills of lading did not report the name of the companies that were actually shipping the military equipment to Israel. Specifically, the report highlights **IFS and IMOD’s abuse of the “Diplomatic Cargo” designation** for goods traveling on **Maersk Line Limited** ships. The authors’ data analysis found that **from 2011–2014, IFS shipped more than 16,000 tons of “diplomatic” cargo across 86 voyages on Maersk Line Limited ships**, much more than what a regulatory agency would consider appropriate use of the diplomatic cargo designation. The authors added:

“**The amount of cargo shipped by the diplomatic mission of Israel [...] hardly adapts to the definition of what a diplomatic cargo should be**, i.e. documents, materials, and goods that are essential for the activities and functioning of the diplomatic mission. Those amounts, totalling [thousands of] tons of cargo in a few years, seem to configure a **stable supply-chain of goods whose nature is hidden to the control of Customs authorities and the public. The use of diplomatic cover for shipping such quantities of cargo should be of high concern**, in particular in presence of widespread **human right abuses** perpetrated by security forces in [...] Israel.”<sup>31</sup>

Given this information, it is worth exploring whether this strategy is being used again. **Of the 2,557 ships analyzed by the Palestinian Youth Movement, 26 were listed as containing diplomatic cargo and additional 731 shipments to IMOD via IFS on Maersk ships had entirely empty product description entries**, raising questions about their contents.

Unrelated to Maersk, this year, a series of Freedom of Information Requests in **Belgium** have revealed that **IFS also serves as IMOD’s freight forwarder for military goods shipments by air**. In one case highlighted, IFS shipped **detonators** and **detonating fuses** to Nevatim Airbase directly from **JFK Airport** in New York, NY.


<sup>31</sup> *Fatal Freight: Ships, Guns and Human Rights Abuses (2017)*, International Peace Information Service (IPIS).

<sup>32</sup> *“70 tons of military equipment destined for Israel”*, RTBF Actus.

Appendix A.

## Maersk shipments to Israeli Ministry of Defense Sep 2023–Sep 2024

The following data visualization illustrates **2,110** U.S. shipments on Maersk vessels listed as being shipped to or on behalf of the Government of Israel's Ministry of Defense (IMOD), categorized according to the **export category** of the goods contained in the shipment.



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Research compiled by the  
**Palestinian Youth Movement**

The **Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM)**  
is a transnational, independent, grassroots  
movement of Palestinian and Arab youth  
struggling for the liberation of our homeland

**instagram** [@palestiniayouthmovement](https://www.instagram.com/palestiniayouthmovement)  
**website** [palestiniayouthmovement.com](http://palestiniayouthmovement.com)

